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Abstract 
 
As a consequence of the new European Legislation on Statutory Audits of Annual 
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, materialized by the Directive 2014/56/EU and 
Regulation Nº 537/2014, the obligation of audit firm rotation is now a reality in the 
European market. This new legislation aims to reduce market concentration on big four 
audit firms and consequently enhance auditor’s independence by reducing risks 
associated with high familiarity between the audit organization and the client company. 
This research aims to contribute to the literature by empirically examining the perceptions 
of the implicit change and by clarifying this new regulation, its advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus, the investigation has as base a qualitative approach, resorting to 
semi-structured interviews and to a sample of Portuguese (big, medium and small) audit 
firms and audited companies of public interest, aiming to assess the their perceptions 
concerning to: audit independence, audit quality, audit market concentration and auditor’s 
opinion (the crucial output of the audit work). The results showed that there is not a 
consensus among the two groups regarding the influence of legislation on the quality and 
on the issue of an opinion. Moreover, despite there is not also an agreement concerning 
the perceived impact on the quality in the first year of the audit engagement, all agreed 
that, in the long run, will exist an improvement. Lastly, all agreed that mandatory audit 
firm rotation has not influence in the market concentration. These findings reinforce the 
relevance of the legislation once the majority of audit firms and clients perceived it has 
being benefic to the audit market. 
 
Key-words: Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, Audit Quality, Audit Independence, 
Auditor’s opinion  
JEL-Codes: M42, M48 
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Resumo 
 
A obrigação de rotação das sociedades de auditoria é, hoje em dia, uma realidade no 
mercado europeu, como consequência da nova legislação europeia relativa à revisão legal 
das contas anuais e consolidadas, materializada pela Diretiva 2014/56/UE e pelo 
Regulamento (UE) nº537/2014. Esta nova legislação visa reduzir a concentração de 
mercado nas big four e melhorar a independência do auditor, reduzindo os riscos 
associados à familiariedade entre a auditora  e a empresa auditada. Este estudo contribui 
para a literatura por examinar empiricamente as percepções das mudanças implícitas do 
requisito obrigatório de rotação da empresa de auditoria e por clarificar a nova legislação, 
as suas vantagens e desvantagens Assim, esta investigação tem como base uma 
abordagem qualitativa, recorrendo a entrevistas semi-estruturadas e a uma amostra de 
empresas portuguesas de auditoria (grandes, médias e pequenas) e de clientes de interesse 
público, tendo como objetivo avaliar as suas percepções em relação à: independência do 
auditor, qualidade de auditoria, concentração do mercado de auditoria e emissão de 
opinão (output crucial do trabalho do auditor). Os resultados mostraram que não existe 
um consenso entre os grupos em relação à influência da legislação na qualidade e na 
emissão de opinão. Além disso, apesar de não existir um concordância, entre auditores e 
clientes, em relação à influência percebida na qualidade de auditoria, ambos concordam, 
que no longo prazo, vai haver uma melhoria na mesma. Por último, todos concordam que 
a rotação obrigatória das sociedades de auditoria não tem influência na concentração de 
mercado. Estes resultados vêm reinforçar a relevância da legislação, uma vez que maioria 
dos auditores e cliente percepciona que a mesma é benéfica para o mercado de auditoria. 
 
Palavras-chave: Rotação obrigatória das sociedades de auditoria, Qualidade de 
Auditoria, Independência do Auditor, Opinião do Auditor 
Códigos JEL: M42, M48 
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1. Introduction 
As consequence of impacts of the recent financial crisis and successive frauds not only in 
the capital market, but also for society as a whole, auditors have been subjected of an 
increasing pressure (Kogut, J., 2013). Audit profession has been facing a number of issues 
surrounding the scope of the audit professional’s performance and the credibility of the 
audit profession. 
Over the last few years, regulations have been changing in order to adapt to the new 
economic reality, to strengthen the independence of the auditor and to restore the climate 
of investor confidence in the profession, causing significant modifications to this area 
(European Commission, 2014). 
Internationally, the appearance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) established new 
mechanisms to a better regulation of the audit market. In the European Union (EU), the 
work began through the reflections promoted by the Green Paper, a publication launched 
by the European Commission with the goal of reflecting on the role of auditors and their 
scope of action as a stabilizing element of the financial system (European Commission, 
2010). This reflection culminated in the materialization of the new European directive on 
statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts and the new regulation on statutory 
audit of public interest entities, being one of the main alterations, and solution to face 
auditor’s pressure, the mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). 
The several discussions about auditor rotation are particularly linked to a threat to 
independence called familiarity. This threat arises from the relationship and trust 
established between the auditor and the key people of the audited entity and this 
relationship can be translated into acceptance of explanations of the entity, by the auditor, 
without proper corroboration of the facts (Barrote, I., 2010). Such relation can reduce 
their critical spirit to avoid confrontation with the entity with whom they already have a 
certain relationship. Audit teams are frequently changing due to promotions or staff 
turnover, however, regarding to the audit partner in charge of the work, the probability of 
change is reduced. Therefore, taking into consideration the aforementioned information, 
the most suitable solution to overcome the independence issue is the rotation of auditing 
companies (Barrote, I., 2010). 
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According to the survey “Organização e Meios para Prestação de Serviços de Auditoria”, 
carried out by the Portuguese Securities Market (CMVM), in 2007, only 30% of audit 
firms had membership rotation policy. The article 42 of Directive 2006/43/EC already 
stated that the partners responsible for statutory audit functions shall be subject to rotation 
within a maximum period of seven years from the date of appointment. That directive 
was amended on 17 June 2016, by the Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts. 
Furthermore, the EU Regulation Nº537/2014 also came into force, and both have imposed 
a new legal regime for audit firm rotation. 
In this new legal context, public interest entities are obliged to change their statutory 
auditors, or their audit firms, every ten years. The duration of the audit engagement has 
to be calculated since the date of the first financial year covered in the audit engagement 
letter. However, member states might extend the maximum duration of an audit work by 
an additional ten years upon tender, or fourteen in the case of joint audit (EU Regulation 
Nº537/2014, article 17). 
Several authors have studied the impact of auditor rotation and the existence of a real 
benefit associated to its adoption. There is few evidence on the effects of audit firm 
rotation and no consensus concerning the benefits of audit alternation. Moreover, there is 
also limited empirical evidence about the relationship between audit-firm tenure and 
financial reports quality. Therefore, there is not clear if MAFR is solving a real problem. 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the present literature by providing an empirical 
study about the perceptions on the impacts of MAFR at the eyes of two relevant 
stakeholders: audit firms and audited companies.   
Interviews with audit companies and audit clients were conducted to obtain evidence 
about the perceptions of the impacts, advantages and disadvantages of MAFR. 
The main research questions of the present dissertation are the following: 
1 – How is the new legislation different than the previous one? 
2 – What are the perceived consequences, advantages and disadvantages of MAFR as 
seen by auditor firms and their clients? 
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3- What, if any, is the expected influence of the new legislation on the auditor’s opinion?  
This dissertation is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents a literature review about 
auditing, while chapter 3 provides a description of relevant legislation in Portugal. 
Chapter 4 discloses the methodology adopted in the study. And, chapter 5, presents the 
main results and discussion. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter focuses on the main concepts and theories relevant for the audit research 
field. Firstly, a definition of audit and its related concepts (audit quality, auditor’s 
independence, MAFR, among others) is presented. Secondly, a literature review is 
provided covering different theories and frameworks that have been developed based on 
the changes and the progress of auditing. Thirdly, similar studies and their contribution 
to the audit field will be presented. Lastly, a critical analysis of the literature reviewed 
will be provided.  
2.1. Audit 
Audit has a Latin origin, that comes from “audire” (hear), and was adopted by the English 
as auditing, to describe the accounting review (Cunha and Pinheiro, 2003). In order to 
adapt to new economic reality, the concept of audit has been extended through time. If 
initially aimed at the discovery of errors and fraud, audit practices went after extending 
up to other areas and to take specific or specialized forms. Therefore, the historical 
developments allow us to check how audit was a reflection of the economic and social 
changes that have been operating since been established as branch of knowledge until the 
present (Tribunal de Contas, 1999).  
In 1998, the author Attie defined audit as a dedicated accounting expertise to test the 
efficiency and effectiveness of asset control deployed for the purpose of expressing an 
opinion on certain data. Sá (1998) defined it as accounting technology applied to the 
systematic exam of the registers, financial statements or other reports, having as goal to 
present opinions, considerations, conclusions, criticism and guidance.  
Recently, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Boards (IAASB, 2014) 
affirms that auditors play a key role in contributing to the credibility of the financial 
statements on which they are reporting. Thus, citing the International Standard on Audit 
(ISA 200), the purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended 
users in the financial statements. Citing also Deloitte (2016), one of the big four, auditing 
is a highly complex process, and the importance of auditors as a vital link in the financial 
reporting chain has never been more important nor their role as trusted advisors more 
value.  
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Audit concept can be easier to understand through its overall objectives:  
“(…) (a) To obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements 
as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, 
thereby enabling the auditor to express an opinion on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable 
financial reporting framework; and 
(b) To report on the financial statements, and communicate as required by the ISAs, 
in accordance with the auditor’s findings. (…)” (ISA 200, 11) 
Audit term is not static and has been discussed during the last few years due to the 
disloyalty in the audit market provoked by financial crisis and scandals.  
2.1.1. Audit Quality  
Audit quality is a key concept in this field of research. However, there is no globally 
accepted definition of audit quality (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
2013). DeAngelo (1981) defined it as: 
“(…) the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) 
discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and (b) report the breach.” 
Attending to this description, the quality of audit is ensured through auditors’ capacity to 
discover the breach and their objectivity and independence to report a breach or 
misstatement in the accounting system or financial statements. However, despite being 
broadly quoted, this definition is also criticized for being vague and imprecise (Kilgore, 
2007)(Apud Raslan et al., 2016).  
According to Monroe and Tan (1997),  
“(…) the quality of an audit can affect the reliability of audited financial 
information, which in turn plays an important role in capital markets.” 
Therefore, audit quality is fundamental to enhance the reliability of the financial 
statements and to provide security and confidence to the capital market participants.  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2013), described audit 
quality as:  
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“(…) meeting investors’ needs for independent and reliable audits and robust audit 
committee communications on: financial statements, including related disclosures; 
assurance about internal control; and going concern warnings.” 
This definition is more focused on results rather than the process itself or inputs. PCAOB 
affirms that is easier to define audit quality in terms of results.  
As already mentioned, there is no agreement regarding the definition of audit quality. 
While some authors define it as the auditors’ ability to perform its work in accordance to 
standards and professional requirements, other focus more on error detection and 
financial statement outcomes. According to Raslan et al., 2016, the definition might differ 
according on the perception of quality for the parts. As a consequence of the recent 
financial crisis and corporate collapses, perception of audit quality have been discussed 
over the last years, having resulted in changes in regulation (Harrison et al., 2011). 
To conclude, Raslan et al. (2016) proposed their definition for audit quality, 
agglomerating other authors’ ideas: 
“(…) the one performed in accordance with legal and professional requirements in 
a manner that could improve the reliability of financial reporting taking into 
consideration the interests of different parties concerned with such quality”.  
Hereupon, it’s also important to mention and clarify some examples of lack of quality 
that can be reflected in the financial statements.  
One way to measure the quality of the audit service is related to auditor’s capability to 
prevent earnings management (Martinez, A. and A. Moraes, 2017). Earning management 
is the act of, intentionally, taking advantage of how accounting rules are applied and 
influence the process of create the financial statements to obtain private gain. Thus, there 
are several studies concerning the relation between audit and earnings management, being 
expectable that audit work be a restriction to managerial discretion in reporting earnings, 
helping to improve the reliability and the quality of the financial information (Huguet, D. 
and Gandía, J., 2016). 
Moreover, it’s also important to understand the relation between earnings management, 
audit quality and voluntary/mandatory audits. Minnis (2011) and Dedman, E. and A. 
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Kausar (2012) studied the effect of voluntary audit on accounting quality (not considering 
the variable mandatory audits) concluding that audit improves quality. However, it’s also 
important to have in consideration the scenario of mandatory audit once that financial 
information is influenced by whether audits are voluntary or mandatory. Thus, the work 
of Huguet, D. and J. Gandía (2016) was based in the three variables (audit quality, 
voluntary audits and mandatory audits) and concluded that despite the fact of voluntary 
audits constrains earnings management, the effect is more visible when the audit is 
mandatory. Thus, although both mandatory and voluntary audits reinforce audit quality 
by restricting the magnitude of accruals, the lower visibility and litigation risks faced in 
the voluntary case incentive them to be less restrictive.   
Other interesting topic is the relation between audit quality, earnings management and 
audit fees. Audit firms tend to compete to offer a personalized service that add value to 
the client, charging higher fees for better quality services (Francis, J., 1984). Thus, audit 
fees can also be a metric of audit quality (Hallak, R. T. P. and A. L. Da Silva, 2012). 
However, higher fees does not necessary means more objectivity and independence from 
the auditor. Once again, there is not in the literature review an agreement between the 
authors. While some defend that higher fees imply a more competent service and lower 
fees means poor quality, other studies concluded that higher fees can have as a 
consequence the loose of independence (Eshleman, D. and P. Guo, 2014). Kinney, W. R. 
and R. Libby (2002) found that higher audit fees could mean illicit acts by the company 
and inflated future earnings. The work of Martinez, A. and A. Moraes (2017) studied the 
relation between audit fees and audit quality, using as proxy the earnings management, 
and concluded that abnormal audit fees create a setting that is more propitious for earnings 
management. 
Another example of lack of quality is the discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals 
is an expense that is not mandatory, which has not yet been performed, but is recorded in 
the company’s account books, such for example management bonus. The study of 
Huguet, D. and J. Gandía (2016) found that non-audit companies have a higher level of 
absolute discretionary accruals than the audited companies. Also, Myers et al. (2003) 
examined the relation between audit quality, using discretionary accruals and the current 
accruals as proxy, and audit tenure. They found that a long audit tenure implies more 
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constraints on both income increasing and income decreasing accruals. Thus, audit 
quality impairs with audit tenure. 
The work of Becker et al. (1998) is also relevant for this point. Their study examines the 
relation between audit quality and earnings management, being this last variable captured 
through discretionary accruals. Assuming that auditors from big six are of higher quality 
comparing with non-big six audit firms, they concluded that clients from non-big six are 
more properly to report discretionary accruals than clients of big six. Also, the mean and 
median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher for non-big six clients.  
To conclude this topic, both earning management and discretionary accruals are example 
of lack of quality and that can be pointed out as one of the reasons that lead to MAFR.  
2.1.2. Audit Independence 
Audit independence has been in focus during the last years, being object of study by 
several authors (Almeida, 2015). The independence requirement is due to the pursuit of 
two basic goals. Audit work be performed with high quality, without the influence of 
external factors, affecting the auditor’s opinion. And also, to provide confidence in 
financial statements to investors (Figueiredo, 2011).  
According to Knapp (1985) (Apud Figueiredo, 2011), independence consists in the ability 
to resist to the pressure exerted by the clients, and based on Arens et al. (1999) (Apud 
Figueiredo, 2011), this concept refers to taking an unbiased position when conducting 
audit tests, results evaluation and issuing an audit opinion, and has underlying the 
integrity, objectivity and impartiality of the professional. For Schandl (1978) (Apud 
Figueiredo,  2011), independence consists in ensuring that personal and material interests, 
as well as the emotions of any professional auditor remain intact, and are not affected by 
third parties, for expressing their opinion and conclusions.  
Moreover, according with Shockley’s work (1981), auditor’s credibility depends 
ultimately on the society perception rather than on the fact of independence. The study 
concluded that companies inserted in highly competitive environments and smaller audit 
firms were perceived as having a higher probability of loss of independence. However, 
the audit tenure seemed to don’t have a significant impact on perceptions of 
independence. Also the work of Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) and Myers et al. (2003) 
  
9 
concluded that longer audit tenure, rather than shorter audit tenure, is associated with 
higher quality earnings. 
Therefore, independence is a dynamic concept, being influenced by different types of 
variables. These meaning and importance have been adapting to the new economic 
realities (Almeida, 2014) and depends on the critical sensibility of the various authors 
(Figueiredo, 2011).   
2.1.2.1. Non-Audit Services and Independence 
Another interesting topic is related to the relation between non-audit services and 
auditor’s independence. The auditor must have an ethic, independent and objective 
conduct. When performing his work, the auditor has access to confidential information, 
once that it has not yet reported to the market. Thus, it might take the auditor to develop 
a threat of personal interest, leading him to get a counterpart for himself.  
In the United Stated of America (USA), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), since 2002, 
prohibits auditors from providing certain types of non-audit services to their clients. 
Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) has also revised the norms 
concerning to auditor independence, being that the rules now limit the circumstances and 
remuneration associated to providing certain types of non-audit services. According to 
Gul et al. (2007), both regulations seems to be based on the assumption that certain types 
of non-audit services provided by audit firms are likely to jeopardize auditor 
independence, and ultimately reducing audit quality.  
In Portugal, according to the Statute of the Order of Chartered Accountants (Law 
Nº140/2015, articles 70º, 71º, 77º, 78º and 79º), the auditor or audit firm that provide a 
service to a public interest entity is prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, to the 
audited entity, to its mother enterprise or to the entities over its control in the European 
Union the following types of non-audit services (article 77º, number 8): 
 Preparation of accounting records and financial statements; 
 Evaluation services; 
 Tax consultancy services and preparation of tax returns, conducting a fiscal 
planning policy, or provide support to solve conflicts from this nature; 
 Internal audit services; 
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 Information technology services; 
 Support services in the settlement of various disputes; 
 Recruitment and selection services;  
 Business finance consulting services. 
Several authors have studied the relation between non-audit fees paid to audit firms and 
auditor independence. According to Frankel et al. (2002), there is a positive relation 
between non-audit fees and the magnitude of discretionary accruals (used as a proxy of 
earnings management), supporting that high non-audit fees are likely to impair auditor 
independence. However, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) used a more consistent measure of 
discretionary accruals and did not find a significant relation between the two variables. 
Also the work of Chung and Kallapur (2003) used a different metric and did not find a 
statistically association.  
Gul et al. (2007) also considered auditor tenure besides variables non-audit fees and 
auditor independence in order to evaluate if the last variable influences the relation 
between the other two. Their study concluded that non-audit fees are likely to influence 
auditor independence for firms having short auditor tenure, and when the client firm size 
is small.  
2.2. Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 
According to Cardozo (1997), our society is currently dominated by big organizations 
having impact in almost all the life’s aspects. Due to its great influence and given the 
existence of information asymmetries and the potential for conflict interests, between 
company management and outside users of financial information, financial reports should 
be audited by a third party (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It’s imperative to ensure the 
audit work is properly done in accordance with audit quality standards and with the audit 
independence requirements.   
Hereupon, the concept of MAFR is not a recent one. Contrariwise, since 1970, it has been 
a discussed topic by legislators and regulators. The controversy arises from the fact of an 
audit firm be paid by the client to issue an audit report on its financial statements, but also 
is expectable to be independent and objective (Edwards, 2014).   
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Auditors has to be able to express an opinion regarding to the financial reports, which are 
one of the main means of communicating financial information to those outside the 
company.  
According to PCAOB (2011), who are in favor of MAFR consider that potential pressure 
over auditors by management would be substituted by an improvement of audit quality, 
due to the fact of audit work can be targeted to scrutiny by another audit entity.  
The argument is based on the fact that long auditor tenure may lead to a reduction on 
audit quality. If an audit firm maintain providing audit services for the same entity for a 
long period, the risk of developing a close relationship with the client might influence and 
compromise independence. Some clients are seen as having a strong financial position 
and with a competent management. In the other side, auditors may expect these client’s 
behavior in the future which may reduce the skepticism and objectivity of their work.  
Periodically changing the audit firm allows to have a new opinion on financial statements, 
allowing auditors face appropriately with the issues that might came up (Carey and 
Simnett, 2006). Also, a long relationship with the same client can be seen as a source of 
a perpetual annuity. Citing the Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprises 
(CPTPE) (2003):  
“Rotation of auditors would also reduce any financial incentives for external 
auditors to compromise their judgment on borderline accounting issues. In 
disagreeing with management, auditors would no longer be risking a stream of 
revenues that they believed would continue in “perpetuity”, since the audit 
engagement would no longer be perceived as permanent”. 
Once auditors’ independence are under threat, fraudulent financial reporting is more 
likely to occur. Authors who are in favor of MAFR expect fraudulent financial reporting 
to be lower in the early years of the audit-client relation and higher in a long audit-firm 
tenure situation. 
On the other hand, the opponents of MAFR, as Myers et al. (2004), Cameran et al. (2012) 
and Ghosh and Moon (2005), claim that the obligation of changing auditor will result in 
higher costs. They also points out that audit quality will decrease during the first years 
with the new engagement, as the auditor moves through the learning curve. Another 
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disadvantage mentioned is the fact of this regulation not consider that only exist a certain 
number of qualified successors, since some auditors have more knowledge in certain 
industries and sectors.  
Auditor’s knowledge is a crucial input to detect material misstatements. However, 
although auditors use different types of knowledge (industry and general knowledge), the 
most relevant one is the client-specific (Melo, A., 2014). According to BDO Seidman 
(2003), the auditor has to be familiar with the client’s environment (business, operations, 
accounting policies and controls).  
Thus, on one side, some authors are focused on auditor knowledge, arguing that audit 
quality is lowest in the early years of the auditor-client relationship and that quality is 
higher given longer tenure. In the opposite, certain studies are more concerned with 
auditor independence threats. Audit quality will be compromised in long auditor tenure 
and that audit quality may be higher in the early years of the relationship.  
However, PCAOB (2011) does conclude on the potential benefits/cost of MAFR, 
concretely, to which point of view has a higher impact to organizations. 
According to Simnett et al. (2014), there are several studies concerning to this topic. The 
works of Deis and  Giroux (1992), Bazerman et al. (2002) and Davis et al. (2009) 
concluded that audit quality decreases as the length of audit tenure increases. But Geiger 
and Raghunandan (2002), Johnson et al. (2002), Carcello and Nagy (2004) and Myers et 
al. (2004) provided controversial results. Myers et al. (2003) and Ghosh and Moon (2005) 
found results against the rationale of the MAFR. 
Despite the number of studies regarding this topic there is not yet a consensus about the 
potential benefits/cost of MAFR. 
The next table, Table 1, summarizes the arguments in favor and against the MAFR:  
Arguments in favor of MAFR Arguments against MAFR 
Risk of developing a too close relationship 
with the client, compromising the 
independence; 
The new audit team might miss problems 
from the previous periods due to its lack 
of experience with the client; 
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Periodically having a new auditor would 
bring a fresh look to the organization’s 
reports and help auditors to properly deal 
with financial reporting issues since 
auditor’s tenure will be shorter; 
There are not enough large audit firms to 
address the audit requirements of large 
companies, causing auditor rotation 
impracticable at the ground level; 
Reduce the concentration of audit market 
in the big four. 
The rotation would only prevent auditors 
of having a more deeply knowledge of a 
client and its business. 
Table 1: Arguments in favor and against MAFR (own elaboration) 
2.2.1. Impact of MAFR in Auditor’s Independence 
Auditor’s independence, as already mentioned, is one of the main reasons why the MAFR 
was established.  
The argument is that audit work will be conducted in a more unbiased and objective way 
in a MAFR scenario, without being influenced by an eventual pressure of a long date 
relation (Cameran et al., 2005). The MAFR assumes that even rotation of only the partner 
responsible by the audit work might not be enough to ensure independence once that audit 
team, who develops the substantial audit work, is not covered by this mechanism. The 
obligation of rotation of the partner has essentially impact in summing up the main 
conclusion and in issuing an opinion.  
The MAFR will ensure a new audit team, a new fresh look over the financial statements 
and, as a consequence, supposed greater independence. However, it is crucial to take a 
look to the “whole picture” and impacts to understand the costs of implementing MAFR.    
2.2.2. Impact of MAFR in Audit Quality 
Audit firm rotation will bring a new fresh look concerning to the financial information 
once that the audit team will perform more substantial work instead of using assumptions 
from the previous audits (Melo, A., 2014). However, is this “fresh new look” enough to 
increase audit quality once that exists a rupture created at knowledge level? 
The quality of the auditor’s work is a crucial element, being the auditor profession so 
rigorous and regulated. Auditors have to perform substantial work to be able to give an 
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opinion concerning the financial statements. Therefore, it is necessary that auditors know 
deeply the organization being audited and all the requirements concerning its activity.  
An academic work from SDA Bocconi School of Management (2002), showed that the 
number of sanctions to auditors, concerning to quality control, are higher in the first years 
of the engagement, proving that exists a decrease of audit quality during that period.  
Thus, there are several authors that consider that quality work are jeopardize during the 
first years of the auditor-client relationship, and then, with the increase of auditor’s 
knowledge on organization activity, there is an increase in quality once auditors are more 
likely to find material misstatements. 
2.2.3. Impact of MAFR in Audit Market Concentration 
MAFR imposed a reconfiguration from the players of the audit market. It is expected to 
observe a change in the market share of big four. 
Before the new regulation, the register of auditors at CMVM was a complex and rigorous 
process, and was hard to create relationships with public interest entities (PIE) in order to 
perform audit services. Henceforth, with the new regulation, the register in CMVM is 
simplified, depending only from auditors’ will to have access to PIE.  
In accordance with the new wording of the article 8, Nº1, of the Portuguese Securities 
Code, the functions of the “auditor registered at CMVM” are now performed by statutory 
auditors, which, under the general terms, must be registered at CMVM for the exercise of 
functions in PIE.  
As Deloitte (2012) mentioned, MAFR decreases the audit market concentration, in 
particular in the entities with some size and complexity operating on industries requiring 
specialization, alerting for the companies difficulties in being specialized in certain 
activities sector.  
2.2.4. Benefits vs Costs 
One relevant topic regarding this domain is to assess if the benefits associated to MAFR 
are higher that their implicit costs, authors are not yet in agreement regarding to this 
aspect.  
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Previously mentioned, the first years of a new engagement might represent a higher risk 
to the auditors once that is necessary to achieve a sufficient level of knowledge to be able 
to issue an opinion. Thus, depending on the audited society, it is necessary to affect more 
resources in the first years of the engagement.  
The price is also a fundamental element in the equation. Both sides, the audit firm and the 
audited organization, desire the minimal price to ensure that the work is provided in 
accordance with the requirements, without problems. MAFR is bringing an addition to 
this cost for the audited companies (Ghosh and Moon, 2005).  
2.2.5. The Italian example 
Italy can be considered as a developed country with regard to the adoption of MAFR, 
having been one of the first European countries to implement it in 1975 (Melo, A., 2014).  
The rule was enforced by Presidential Decree D.P.R. 136/1975, becoming effective for 
all listed companies in the mid-eighties. Regulation imposed a maximum term of three 
years by mandate, renewable two times, totalizing a maximum period of nine years. 
Despite the several critics, MAFR remains consistent with its early form. 
Thus, once MAFR has been applied for some years, Italy is an important contribute to 
understand and to perceive the effects of this rule in Portugal. However, once again, the 
opinions concerning the impact of MAFR to Italy diverge.  
Cameran et al. (2012) are against saying that rotation implies an addition to costs, which 
is only compensatory if it directly influences the quality of the audit work. However, the 
same doesn’t happen. As already mentioned, the quality is really influenced by auditor 
knowledge concerning the audited company. As the learning curve proves, knowledge 
increases as the auditor gains experience with the client. Another important aspect 
considered in their study was market concentration. Contrary to what was expected, the 
market share of big four had an increase. 
In response to some constrains, Italian govern created a study commission with the goal 
of analyzing the transparency in force in the listed entities market, being one of the main 
aspects related to the efficiency of MAFR. This study concluded that MAFR was an 
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important drive of transparency and objectivity, once auditors are not influenced by hope 
of renewal (FEE, 2004). 
Hereupon, the Italian example allowed us to perceive that despite of not existing a 
consensus regarding to MAFR, in this specific case, there is a higher number of negative 
impacts of this mechanisms, studied and analyzed by diverse authors, alerting for the 
hypothesis that maybe MAFR is not the best measure for the European market to reinforce 
auditor’s independence and the quality of audit work. 
2.3. Main Theories and/or Models  
Several different theories have been used to clarify the need and demand for audit. Four 
of those main theories will be mentioned and explained in the following paragraphs. 
Until 1940, the Policeman Theory was broadly acceptable in audit. According to this 
theory, the auditor should behave as a policeman focusing on arithmetical accuracy and 
on the prevention and detection of fraud. However, as already mentioned, the main goal 
of audit is to provide reasonable assurance and verify the truth and fairness of the financial 
statements. Beyond that, the detection of fraud is a conflictual topic that is still in debate 
on the auditor’s responsibilities (Ittonen, 2010). In this sense, given the contradictions 
explained, there is a loss of importance of this theory.  
The Lending Credibility Theory affirms that the primary function of audit is to enhance 
the credibility of the financial statements. In accordance with this theory, auditors are 
providing, or even selling, credibility. Financial statements, when audited, are used to add 
confidence to the management (Ittonen, 2010). In audit terms, audit will reduce the 
information asymmetry, allowing the users of financial statements to make better 
investment decisions, sustained by trustful information. However, some authors, as Porter 
(1993), affirmed that audited information should not be a primary basis when doing an 
investment decision.  
The Theory of Inspired Confidence (of Limperg) addresses both the demand and the 
supply for audit services. The participation of outside stakeholders in an organization has 
as consequence a demand for audit services. Stakeholders require accountability from 
management in exchange for their participation to the company. Knowing by hand that 
management can be tempted to provide biased information, audit services are required to 
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assess it (Ittonen, 2010). Regarding the supply of audit services, the auditor’s function is 
strive to meet the public expectations and to provide a certain level of assurance to 
stakeholders. In short, this theory connects the society’s need for reliability of financial 
information to the ability of audit procedures to meet these needs (Sijpesteijn, 2011). 
Lastly, Agency Theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) addresses the relationship between 
managers and investors. The manager has to perform its duties according to the interest 
of investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the role of the auditor is to supervise 
the relationship between these two agents. However, the responsibility of each part has 
to be well defined in order to avoid gap expectations. Thus, organizations hire auditors to 
review managers’ work and to reduce record errors, asset misappropriations or even fraud 
within the company. Thereby, through the requirement of audit services it is expectable 
to observe a decrease of potential interest’ conflicts, and in parallel an increase in 
investor’s wealth and in company’s value (Inácio et al., 2015).  
The new directive can be explained having as base the Lending Credibility theory. The 
MAFR aims to reduce the threat to audit independence, resulting from a close relationship 
developed between the audit firms and the clients, and to increase the audit quality, 
performing more substantive tests. Once these goal are ensured, the credibility of 
financial statements will increase and the information asymmetry will be reduced, since 
auditors will have an external pressure to perform a more carefully and rigorous work. 
2.4. Similar (relevant) studies 
There are several studies that analyze the impact of firm rotation on audit quality, on audit 
independence and on auditor’s report.  
Melo (2014), analyzed the relation between listed firms audit rotation and auditor’s 
opinion. Using a sample of listed Portuguese firms, from 2000 to 2013, the author aimed 
to understand the existence of additional qualifications as a consequence of audit rotation. 
The main conclusion was that MAFR leads to a reinforcement of auditor’s independence 
and to a higher degree of opinion’s qualification.  
Simnett et al. (2014) used a sample of 6,710 companies listed on the Korean Stock 
Exchange, from 2000 to 2009, and concluded that audit quality did not increase 
significantly, when compared with a period before the implementation of MAFR. The 
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authors also concluded that audit fees are considerably higher than in the pre-regulation 
period.    
Fontaine et al. (2015) studied auditor independence, objectivity and the costs associated 
with switching between audit firms. The authors interviewed 19 audit committee 
members’ interviewed and all of them did not defend the adoption of MAFR. In their 
opinion, professional judgment and observations are the most effective tool to ensure 
auditor independence.   
Cameran et al. (2016) analyzed changes in audit quality during the auditor engagement 
period. Using a sample of Italian non-financial listed companies, from 1985 to 2004, this 
study proved that not only auditors become more conservative (preferring more 
conservative accounting) in the last year, compared with the previous, but also the 
investors tend to perceive a better audit quality in the last year.  
In conclusion, despite the considerable number of studies on the impacts of audit firm 
there is not yet a consensus. While some authors are in favor of the obligation of audit 
firm rotation and defend that it will bring benefits for the audit sector (Bazerman et al., 
2002, Davis et al., 2009, among others), other authors defend that benefits are not as clear 
as they seem to be and that the inherent cost of this directive can be higher than the 
expected (Myers et al., 2003, Ghosh and Moon, 2005, among others). Besides that, in the 
literature review, there is a lack of research concerning this topic in a Portuguese context.  
This investigation intends to fulfill a gap in the literature, by providing evidence of the 
perception of Portuguese audit firms (of different sizes) and audited entities on the 
impacts of the MAFR namely on audit quality, audit independence, audit market 
concentration and on the auditors’ opinion. 
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3. Legislation in Portugal 
Presently, the audit market is regulated by the Directive 2014/56/EU, of 16th April of 
2014, of the European Parliament and by the Council on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts. The EU Regulation Nº537/2014, of 16th April of 
2014, also was adopted, and both have imposed a new legal regime for audit firm rotation. 
Moreover, in Portugal, two national measures have resulted from this: Law nº140/2015 
(regarding the new Statutes of the Order of Chartered Accountants), of 7th September, 
and Law nº148/2015 (concerning to the legal regime of audit supervision), of 9th 
September. 
The Law Nº140/2015 establishes the legal regime for creation, organization and 
operations of professional public associations. While  the Law Nº148/2015, which 
amends the Directive 2006/43/CE, ensures the execution, in the intern legal order, of EU 
Regulation Nº537/2014, is relative the specific requirements for the legal account revision 
of public interest entities.  
One of the main changes of this new legal context, from the previous directive, is related 
to its structure. New directive completely separates the regulation of the audit activity of 
the so-called “normal” entities of public interest entities, the latter being contemplated on 
EU Regulation Nº537/2014. 
This new European directive aims to establish the goals of audit profession of the 
members’ states with the view of European harmonization. Each state member opts for 
the ways to achieve that goals, being all obligated to adapt it and to transpose it into 
national law.  
The new directive introduces news that respects to: some definitions, including the public 
interest entity definition, the rules concerning the independence and objectivity of the 
auditor, the general organization of auditor and his work, the quality control and new 
requirements regarding to penalties and sanction, the audit report and to the additional 
requirements for the audit committees of public interest entities.  
One innovation that should be highlighted regarding this topic is the possibility of 
providing audit services by an entity from a member state in another member state of the 
EU. Following the philosophy of common market of EU, sustained by the free circulation 
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of goods, services, people and capital, this opening will foster the growth of audit firms, 
allowing the various organizations of small and medium size to develop, being also an 
instrument to decrease the audit market concentration in the big four.  
It also should be pointed out the temporary impediment to hire the statutory auditors by 
the audited companies to carry out management duties, functions in the audit committee 
and supervision bodies. This measure presupposes a minimum period of one year, or two 
in case of public interest entity, before a possible hiring.  
Lastly, the highlight goes to the article Nº25A, mentioning that the scope of statutory 
audit “not include a guarantee regarding to the future viability of the audited entity or the 
efficiency and effectiveness with which the management or management body has 
conducted or will conduct the entity’s activities” (European Commission, 2014). This 
statement is a legislative safeguard and clarifies the scope of audit profession to all users 
of financial information.    
3.1. Public Interest Entity definition 
As mentioned above, the definition of public interest entity changed with new regulation. 
Once MAFR is applied to these entities, it’s important to recognize the companies under 
this rule. Thus, the companies are considered as PIE, according with Law nº148/2015 of 
9th September, article Nº3, when they are: 
 The issuers of securities admitted to trading on a regulated market; 
 Credit institutions; 
 Investment firms; 
 Collective investment undertakings; 
 Venture capital companies, venture capital investment companies and venture 
capital funds; 
 Specialized alternative investment companies and specialized alternative 
investment funds; 
 Credit securitization companies and securitization funds; 
 Insurance and reinsurance undertakings; 
 Holding companies, when the holdings held give them the majority of voting 
rights in credit institutions; 
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 Holding companies in insurance sector and the mixed insurance holding 
companies; 
 Pension funds; and, 
 Public undertaking which, for two consecutive years, have a turnover in excess of 
EUR 50 million or a net asset in excess of EUR 300 million (do not mention when 
they start counting the two years). 
3.2. Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in Portugal 
The focus in this dissertation is the MAFR stated in the EU Regulation Nº537/2014, 
article 16 and 17, and is synthesized in two parts, the designation and the duration.  
The auditor nomination should occur by recommendation of the audit committee to the 
audit entity, in which in an exempt form presents, at least, two options, and affirms his 
independence regarding to the choices. If designation corresponds to a possible situation 
of renewal of mandate, it is elaborated a selection process, with previous requirements 
defined by the committee, being then elaborated a conclusion report of the process 
explaining the results, having as base the criteria defined.  
Regarding the duration, public interest entities are obliged to change their statutory 
auditors, or their audit firms, every ten years. The time of the audit engagement has to be 
calculated since the date of the first financial year covered in the audit engagement letter. 
However, member states might extend the maximum duration of an audit work by an 
additional ten years upon tender in the case of designation is made through public tender, 
or fourteen in the case of joint audit. The extension only becomes effective by 
recommendation of audit committee, headed to the general meeting of shareholders. To 
this exclusive extension, there is yet the possibility, exceptionally, of public interest entity 
require to national authorities the extension of the auditor mandate, with a maximum 
duration of two years.  
Concerning  the rotation of the responsible partners of the audit work, the duration is the 
same of the previous directive, which is seven years, being the only difference the time 
before new designation, from two to three years. The new directive allows the state 
members the possibility to reduce the maximum period of seven years. 
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The auditor or audit firm should also create internal mechanisms of internal rotation, 
including, at least, people recognized as statutory auditors. Also, the auditors have to be 
able to demonstrate that the same is being applied and is in accordance to the context and 
the activity. Therefore, the rule ensures not only rotation of the partners responsible by 
the work but also the rotation of audit team. 
The rotation of partners and of audit firms comes in response to reinforce auditor 
independence, by reducing the threat of familiarity, but will also change the audit market 
structure and the quality of audit work. 
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4. Methodology 
The present investigation has as goal to understand the perceived impact of new audit 
legislation, mainly on audit quality, audit independence, audit market concentration and 
auditor’s opinion, by the auditors and the audited entities. It is important to take into 
account that the issue in question is characterized by scarcity and dispersion of data, since 
the adoption of legislation is recent and few authors have considered it. Moreover, as 
already mentioned in the literature review, there is a lack of studies regarding the 
obligation of audit firm rotation having as evidence entities from Portugal and there is not 
a consensus concerning the main impact of it. 
Considering the similar studies considered in the chapter 2, visible in table 2, one can 
conclude that there is not a defined pattern regarding the methodology used for the 
analysis of the MAFR.  
Similar Studies Methodology/Sample Country 
of Study 
Conclusions 
A Rotação das 
Sociedades de 
Auditoria: Estudo 
dos Pareceres do 
PSI Geral (Melo, 
2014) 
Quantitative and Case 
Study 
Sample of listed 
companies, from 2000 
to 2013 
Portugal MAFR leads to a 
reinforcement of 
auditor’s independence 
and to a higher degree of 
opinion’s qualification.  
The effect of MAFR 
on Audit Quality 
and Audit Fees: 
Evidence from the 
Korean Market 
(Simnett et al., 
2014) 
Quantitative 
Sample of 6,710 listed 
companies, from 2000 
to 2009 
Korean Audit quality did not 
increase significantly and 
audit fees are 
considerably larger than 
in the pre-regulation 
period.  
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Audit committee 
perspectives on 
mandatory audit 
firm rotation: 
evidence from 
Canada (Fontaine et 
al., 2015) 
Qualitative 
Interviews to 19 audit 
committee members 
Canada The interviewed 
members don’t defend 
MAFR. Participants 
believe that their 
professional judgment 
and observations are the 
most effective way of 
ensuring auditor 
independence and view 
MAFR as an unnecessary 
intervention. 
MAFR and Audit 
Quality (Cameran et 
al., 2016) 
Quantitative. 
Sample of non-
financial listed 
companies, from 1985 
to 2004 
Italia Auditors become more 
conservative and 
investors tend to perceive 
a better audit quality in 
the last year.  
Table 2: Methodological aspects of the similar studies (own elaboration) 
The empirical analysis to be undertaken in the present study aims to assess the differences 
that new legislation will imply, if any, and the advantages and disadvantages from it, and 
if really exists an influence of MAFR on the auditor’s opinion. 
For this dissertation, due to the characteristics of the information available and to the fact 
that legislation was adopted recently, our analysis will be mainly focused on a qualitative 
approach. This methodology will use data from interviews and legislation analysis.  
According to Mason J. (2002), the qualitative analysis is recognized as important once it 
allows to explore several dimensions from the social world, such as the understanding 
and experience from the participants. This way it’s possible to perceive problems, study 
behaviors or attitudes, allowing to develop concepts and ideas through patterns 
discovered in data and not only collect data to check models, as in a quantitative analyze 
(Sousa, M. J. and C .S. Batista, 2011). With a small data, it’s possible to obtain rich, 
detailed and new information. In line with the presented above, this study will opt for the 
use of in-depth interviews, which are characterized in a qualitative investigation by the 
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existence of open questions and a small sample. Thus, it will be explored, through the 
usage of interviews, the knowledge, perception and experience of people that assume a 
crucial role from the social reality at the qualitative methodology (Mason J., 2002). 
According to the same author, the interviews have implicit a more complex and 
exhaustive planning and implementation than questionnaires, where the questions and 
answers are previously defined. Regarding the structure, it will be semi-structured in 
order to facilitate the comparison and analysis of the data. This type of interviews are 
presented as a dialog-based interaction, with a relatively informal style, focused on topics 
and on the relevant contexts so that knowledge can be produced (Mason J., 2002). 
Therefore, through the interviews this investigation aims to understand the perception of 
the people interviewed concerning the MAFR. Thus, it’s crucial know how to manage the 
social and intellectual dynamics of the interview in order to obtain relevant data, since 
they depend on the people’s ability to verbalize, remember and interact (Mason J., 2002). 
Concerning to the interviews to audit firms, the main aim is to understand their opinion 
concerning this new legislation and what are, if any, the main changes that it will imply 
inside the company (in terms of costs and non-audit services). These interviews will also 
allow to know if the perception is influenced by the size of the audit firm. Moreover, it 
aims to realize if the auditors are more rigorous and weighted, when performing their job 
with a new client, and if it exists any influence of MAFR on the auditor’s opinion. 
Regarding the interviews to the audited entities, the main goal is to understand what is 
their perception regarding the impact of a new team on the quality and on the issue of an 
opinion.  
4.1. Methodology 
An exploratory qualitative methodology was adopted for the present research. 
Data collection was done through the use of semi-structured interviews. When using 
semi-structured interviews a prior set of questions / topics are identified, the script, 
although the interviewee has some freedom to approach related topics (Sousa, M. J. and 
C. S. Baptista, 2011). According to Manzini, E. J. (2004), one of the characteristics of 
this type of interviews is that the interviewer don’t have to become a hostage of the 
questions prepared in advance. Semi-structured interviews allow to ask other type of 
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questions, not included in the script, to understand better the information that is being 
provided or even the chance to ask momentary questions that seem to have relevance for 
the topic.  
This methodology was deemed the most adequate given the importance of both 1) 
collecting perceptions of specific aspects of the MAFR (such as audit independence, 
quality, opinion and market concentration) and of 2) allowing a certain degree of freedom 
of expression to capture opinions not previously considered in the interview scrip, thus 
enriching the work through the depth and diversity of information, 
The interview script was designed (see Annex 1 and 2) and was based on previous 
research of several authors (Johnson, V. E. et al., 2002; Jackson, A. B. et al., 2008; and, 
Melo, A., 2014, among others) and on the extant literature review.  
The sample was defined according to the following criteria: 
 For auditing companies: a selection of big, medium and small audit companies. 
Big companies were chosen between the big four audit companies; medium 
companies were considered as companies that provide more than audit services 
and have three or more auditors; and, small companies only provide audit service 
and have only one or two auditors; 
 Concerning the audited entities: only public interest entities were considered.  
Interviewees were scheduled through emails, in some cases directly to the interviewees, 
and in others, in a first instance to the firms’ general e-mail which was then re-routed to 
the individuals that matched the desired criteria. It was possible to perform a set of 9 
interviews, 6 to male and 3 female participants. Being interviewed 2 partners of big audit 
firms, 2 partners of medium audit firms and 3 of small audit firms. Concerning the public 
interest entities, 2 public interest entities were interviewed. To protect the confidentiality 
of the interviewees, their names have been replaced by initials according to categories. 
Auditors have been replaced by BAF (big audit firm), MAF (medium audit firm) and SAF 
(small audit firm) and clients by CF (client firm). Table 3 provides the characterization 
of the sample: 
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Table 3: Characterization of the sample  
Data collection was performed between April and August 2017, with an average duration 
of 20/40 minutes per interview. From the 9 interviews, 8 were made face-to-face at the 
auditors' workplace and 1 was by video call (Skype). 
The interviews started with a brief explanation of the research objective of  studying the 
perception of the impact of MAFR on four variables: audit quality, audit independence, 
audit market concentration and auditor’s opinion. After that the interviewees were asked 
Interviewed Age Gender Academic 
Qualifications 
Years as 
Statutory 
Auditor/ 
Working in 
the Client 
Job 
SAF1 59 M Master in 
Business 
Finance 
18 Partner 
Auditor 
SAF2 40 M Bachelor 
Degree in 
Management 
and in Law 
11 Partner 
Auditor 
SAF3 60 M Bachelor 
Degree 
22 Partner 
Auditor 
MAF1 41 F Bachelor 
Degree 
6 Partner 
Auditor 
MAF2 46 F Bachelor 
Degree 
16 Partner 
Auditor 
BAF1 55 M Bachelor 
Degree 
27 Partner 
Auditor 
BAF2 45 M Bachelor 
Degree in 
Economics 
8 Partner 
Auditor 
CF1 38 F Bachelor 
Degree 
7 CFO 
CF2 51 M Bachelor 
Degree in 
Economics  
27 CFO 
  
28 
some biographical data and then the semi-structured interview started with the use of open 
questions. Despite the existence of a script, the order of the questions was not always the 
same, changing with the course of the conversation, and new questions were introduced 
when necessary to clarify a certain aspect revealed by the interviewee. All verbal 
interviews were recorded and later transcribed for content analysis. 
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5. Results 
The present chapter will present the main results obtained from the interviews to the 
statutory auditors and the clients, concerning the topic of MARF impacts. In order to be 
easier the understanding of the results, they will be aggregated into sections.  
5.1. Auditor Independence 
According to Cameran et al. (2005), the introduction of the obligation of audit firm 
rotation will bring more independence to the audit work. Audit will be conducted in a 
more unbiased way without an eventual pressure of a long tenure relation.  
However, Shockley (1981) argued that more than being independent, it is important for 
the market to have this perception. In his work, the author showed that audit tenure 
doesn’t have a significant impact on perceptions of independence, but small audit firms 
can be perceived as the companies having the higher probability of independence loss.  
In order to perceive the influence in independence, the initial question was: “What impact 
do you expect to have on auditor independence?” and the answers were (table 4 and 5): 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Increases No direct relation 
SAF1 X  
SAF2  X 
SAF3 X  
MAF1  X 
MAF2 X  
BAF1  X 
BAF2  X 
CF1 X  
CF2 X  
Total 5 4 
% 55.56 44.44 
Table 4: Perception of the impact on the independence of the audit  
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Interviewed Subcategories 
Increases No direct relation 
Small Audit Firms (SAF) 2 1 
Medium Audit Firms (MAF) 1 1 
Big Audit Firms (BAF)  2 
Clients Firms (CF) 2  
Total 5 4 
Table 5: Sum up of perception of the impact on the independence of the audit 
As it can be seen in the synthesis carried out in the table 4 and 5, there is a diversity of 
opinions. However, an independence increase is perceived by the majority of the 
interviewees, there is not a general consensus between the auditors group.  
Both clients firms agreed that the new legislation contributed to an increase of the 
auditor’s independence, reinforcing the idea that an overly long relationship between the 
auditor and the client could be detrimental to ensuring the auditor's integrity and 
competence. Cameran et al. (2005) also pointed out this reason, reinforcing that the 
auditor is no longer under the client’s pressure, conducting a more precise and objective 
audit.  
Moreover, on the auditor’s side there is not a consensus. Even more, four of the seven 
auditors said that MAFR has not a direct influence on the independence. Big audit firms 
agreed in that this new legislation has no impact on independence, but within the group 
of small and medium audit firms there is controversy, as can be seen in the following 
extracts: 
- “The new legislation reinforces independence. By changing the whole work team we are 
ensuring that there is no room for any pressure, with the final work being more 
impartial.” SAF1 
- “We must be always independent. And independence also means not be financially 
dependent of a client, fact that our order and ISA’s always pointed out. A client should 
never represent a certain percentage of the portfolio. (…) I would say that it contributes 
to a more marked independence, it alerts the auditee that there is such independence and 
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that it is not possible to overthrow it and to the auditors, to us, that we have to be careful 
about our certification.” SAF3 
-“It may have some impact eventually in the year of rotation, but I'm not sure there's a 
direct effect. Independence should already exist, I believe this comes from people rather 
than rules. If the profile / organization is highly oriented to the issue of independence, I 
do not think it is by the rotation rule that this will influence. But it is also very important 
that an organization looks independent. And in this case I think that the rotation has this 
effect, providing that idea to the market. In my opinion, if the mandates were shorter, 
three / four years, had more scrutiny, exposed the auditors much more, and independence 
would be greater.” MAF1 
-“The fact that we audit the same client for a long time, even though we try to maintain 
independence and be rigorous in the work we do, the medium and long term perspective 
may allow us to speak and negotiate with the client some changes, however the client 
might not change them immediately. But now with rotation deadlines, everything comes 
in the report because no one wants to take unnecessary risks.” MAF2 
-“Under normal conditions, it should not influence independence because the auditor 
should remain exempt. However, I agree that over the years there may be a tendency for 
loss of independence. Regarding audit society, I believe that even if the team is 
maintained and the partner is running, that after some time, the degree of trust that may 
exist may lead to not innovating and not giving attention to some aspects that may seem 
well which are not actually well. I think that the lack of independence can be due to the 
routines and habits that can be created and the lack of innovation.” BAF1 
-“An audit relationship incurs risk of familiarity, an auditor who audits the same entity 
eventually creates ties that may overshadow the independence. But already before this 
legislation, there was the obligation of rotation of the member in charge of the work in 
order to assure the question of the independence. I am a bit skeptical about the fact that 
changing the auditing company will bring more independence. I do not think it's 
measurable, we can’t establish a direct relationship. One of the objectives of the 
legislation is to increase independence, but I am somewhat critical of the fact that this 
actually limits dependency. However, the new legislation limits the provision of services 
and the weight of a certain entity in the portfolio, so there may be an increase in 
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independence. But, there is no direct relationship. It is not because I have a financial 
dependence on a client that I will fail to comply with the auditing standards. In essence, 
the regulator wanted to arrange a set of measures so that the audit work be perceived by 
the market as independent, quality, competent and exempt.” BAF2 
5.2. Audit Quality 
There is not an agreement in the literature regarding the impact of mandatory rotation in 
audit quality. Some authors (such as: Myers et al., 2004; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; 
Cameran et al., 2012) defend that the lack of knowledge will have a higher effect, while 
others (the Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprises, 2003, Carey and 
Simnett, 2006) affirm that a new audit team will bring a “fresh look” over the financial 
statements and over the main aspect of the companies. Even more, some authors, like 
Deis and Giroux (1992) or Bazerman et al. (2002), are in favor of MAFR, once that, as 
they proved in their work, a long audit tenure can influence negatively the audit quality.  
Regarding to this topic, we asked: “What impact do you expect audit firm rotation to have 
on audit quality in the first year?” and the answers, table 6 and 7, were: 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Improves Decreases No direct relation 
SAF1  X  
SAF2  X  
SAF3 X   
MAF1   X 
MAF2  X  
BAF1  X  
BAF2  X  
CF1   X 
CF2                                                                                    X
Total 1 5 3 
% 11.11 55.56 33.33 
Table 6: Perception of the impact on the quality of the audit in the first year 
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Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Improves Decreases No direct 
relation 
Small Audit Firms (SAF) 1 2  
Medium Audit Firms (MAF)  1 1 
Big Audit Firms (BAF)  2  
Clients Firms (CF)   2 
Total 1 5 3 
Table 7: Sum up of perception of the impact on the quality in the first year 
 
As it is possible to observe in table 6 and 7, 55.56% of the interviewed believe in the 
occurrence of a loss in quality in the first year after rotation, but the clients do not expect 
such influence.  
However, despite the fact interviewees disagreed regarding the impact in the first year, it 
is important to note that they were all in agreement about the long run improvement in 
the quality of the audit.  
-“There is indeed pressure from management that can influence the quality of the 
auditor's work. Rotation has a beneficial effect in that, at the time of the transition, the 
reviewer has to be especially sure that the accounts do not in fact have problems.” SAF2 
-“What is lost in taking some time to know the new client’s structure, is gained in 
independence. Idea of being new at the company, I’m not clinging to old vices. By virtue 
of the statutes and today's ISA's, we are required to sign a contract with the entity. There 
is a contractual responsibility and prior to this, we are required to do a study of the 
company to find out what are the areas of significant risk. It is also important to realize 
with whom we relate, whether management and managers are capable and keenly aware 
of the rules. The new legislation warns of the nature of management and the importance 
of internal control. It has clearly improved auditing quality.” SAF3 
-“One of the assumptions is for the new auditor to meet with the client's previous auditor 
in order to discuss the entity's key risks and key aspects, and then, at the outset, the new 
auditor is positioned on key issues. I tend to think that there is a concern that in the first 
year there will be more quality and scrutiny because the main concern is to follow up the 
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risks that had already been identified and try to diagnose/identify other risk situations. 
So, honestly, I would not say that quality is lost in the year of transition.” MAF1 
-“The first year is a year of investment in knowing the customer, we can characterize it 
by the sector but then each customer has its own particularities and somehow we do not 
have the total knowledge if not to the end of at least one year of relation with the 
customer.” MAF2  
-“In the early years, it is difficult to do audit work with quality, audit risk increases 
significantly. They are large organizations, with complex operations, some with great 
geographic dispersion, which makes it take a few years for the auditor to truly control 
operations.” BAF1 
-“ Clearly, the new auditor in the first year has a gap of knowledge and it will take some 
time, some years, to reach a level of knowledge and experience in that entity, not only the 
numbers and risks of the business, but much in relation to the profile, behavior and ethics 
of the entity's management bodies. There is a loss of quality in the change because, 
whether we like it or not, even if audit firms allocate a large number of resources, in the 
first year, they would not be able to get the knowledge of the outgoing auditor. With the 
years and with the work, the knowledge is being improved and enriched, the auditor is 
gaining a greater sensitivity.” BAF2 
-“In the first year, there will be questions raised that were not in the past. The input level 
for us will be fruitful because it will be other eyes to see the same issues and sometimes 
there are approaches that are made that are distinct from the previous auditor. In our 
case, we had the same auditor a lot of time, almost 20 years. I believe the new auditor 
will be better. Not that we have complained about the previous auditor, but because they 
are "new eyes". Incidentally, we already noticed that when the audit team changed. So I 
think we're going to get some improvement, in the long term, which is limited, initially, 
by the lack of knowledge.” CF1 
According to Myers et al. (2004), Cameran et al. (2012) and Ghosh and Moon (2005), 
rotation implies an additional cost. Thus, we expected that the audit firms and the audited 
entities had a perception that the new legislation will influence the costs. 
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In the interview we asked: “What impact do you expect the rotation of audit firms to have 
in costs?” and the answers were, as table 8 shows: 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Influences cost No influences costs 
SAF1 X  
SAF2 X  
SAF3 X  
MAF1 X  
MAF2 X  
BAF1 X  
BAF2 X  
CF1 X  
CF2 X  
Total 9  
% 100  
Table 8: Perception of the impact on costs 
Observing table 8, it’s possible to verify that all the interviews agreed that MAFR will 
impact costs, but they all mentioned that it will not be significant. Both sides consider 
that the change implies a strong investment of time and resources, which has an implicit 
cost. As BAF2 pointed out, cost is necessary to overcome the lack of information and the 
loss of quality in transaction. “There is a strong investment in the first year due to the 
loss of quality in the transaction. In order to overcome this loss, I have to allocate a more 
robust team with more experience and more people and this has to have a higher cost 
with the startup of this client.” BAF2 
The perception of audit firms is that in the first year the cost is due to the effort to get to 
know the company: its risks, its business, its environment and its internal controls. Also, 
in some cases, the audit team has to be reinforced, not only in number, but also in 
knowledge, having auditors with more experience in the field. The following extracts 
from the interviews prove this point. 
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-“I believe there is a cost increase, but not a significant one. There is always work that 
has to be done in the first year, such as analysis of the company’s environment, regulation 
and internal control. In the following years, there is only an improvement of what has 
already been done and, eventually, a review of the themes underlying possible audit alerts 
of previous years.” SAF3 
-“It is possible that there is an increment of costs but not significant. But if it is a society 
that lacks resources and has to go to the market to recruit, the price I believe is higher 
and in this case yes, there is an increase in costs.” MAF2 
Regarding the public interest entities, the cost is related to clarify and help auditors to 
perceive how things work inside the company and the reasons behind the decisions 
implicit on the financial statements. Reinforcing this idea, CF2 stateds the rotation will 
impact costs due to “having to explain everything again in the first meetings with the new 
auditor”. Also CF1 mentioned that “are already feeling it because the new audit firm 
began work in June” and there “is a re-start of everything, there is no longer a routine. 
There has been a set of additional work on our part to respond to the requests of those 
who do not know us.” 
5.3. Audit Market Concentration 
One of the main goals of the adoption of the new legislation is the reduction of the market 
concentration in the big four. However, Cameran et al. (2012), in their work, evidenced 
that this goal is not achieved.  
We asked the auditors and the clients:” What impact do you expect the rotation of audit 
firms to have in market concentration?” and, as shown in table 9, our results are aligned 
with Cameran et al. (2012). None of the interviewees expect an influence of MAFR in 
concentration. They mention that is expected to observe a dispersion in market shares, 
but always between the big audit firms. 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Influences concentration No influences in concentration 
SAF1  X 
SAF2  X 
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SAF3  X 
MAF1  X 
MAF2  X 
BAF1  X 
BAF2  X 
CF1  X 
CF2  X 
Total  9 
%  100 
Table 9: Perception of the impact on audit market concentration 
Also, medium audit firms don’t see it as an opportunity due to the implicit risk, of 
performing audit to a public interest entity, and to the high number of resources involved, 
which they most probably don’t have. However, even if only affecting the big four, there 
is an overall perception that it will be beneficial to the market.  
MAF1 suggested that “if it were in force in Portugal join audits, instead of just being an 
audit firm”, one big and one small or medium audit firm auditing the same firm, for 
example, the concentration of audit market will decrease and, not only the client benefits 
from it, but also the whole audit market. MAF1 said “The big players in the market, those 
who generate the biggest fees, more public interest, more public opinion and more 
scrutiny will run between the big four, with rare exceptions. If it were in force in Portugal 
join audits, instead of just being an audit firm there were two, and there would be mutual 
self-regulation, there would be a better evaluation of the risk, the work to be developed, 
and there would be a greater debate, which tends to enrich. The more people get into the 
discussion, the more likely there will be more stringent procedures in the audit process. 
In this situation, there would be a dispersion of concentration and more players could 
enter and there would be a sharing of know-how”.  
Concerning to others interviews, follows some extracts from their perceptions concerning 
to audit market concentration:  
-“I do not think that it is an opportunity for small audit firms or that it influences market 
concentration. The small auditor does not have this obligation in terms of turnover. In 
addition, the big audit houses, the big four, have other means. They invade the market by 
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offering services in order to catch the customer. Small market players do not have the 
means to audit large clients such as public interest entities. They are entities that require 
means, above all human, in large numbers and very well trained to be alert to all possible 
problems.” SAF3 
-“Essentially among the big four, even because we are talking about large customers. But 
attention, even if it is just a reallocation between the big four, does not mean that it is not 
positive for the audit market in general.” MAF2 
-“Will not cause dispersion. Moreover, I do not know how small audit firms would provide 
a multi-geographical service or how would have a team of experts from different 
backgrounds. If I only have one client in one sector, I will not bring much value to it 
because I have no comparison term. But if you have multiple clients in the same industry, 
I can use the best of each of them to help others develop.” BAF1 
-“I think it's very relative. Whether we like it or not, there is a division in the market. The 
first division of the big four and the remainder in the second division. There's going to be 
a bigger distribution among the big four. Regarding to the second division to enter this 
market, I admit that yes, they may come in, but they are entities, from the point of view of 
resources, knowhow and skills, do not have much experience. Even for the client, moving 
from a big four to a small / medium society is risky. Moreover, the client itself, from what 
I have seen, has only been inviting other big four for auditing competition. That is why it 
is very relative if this will change the concentration. I admit that there may be an 
exception, but it is only within a very long timeframe that there can be evolution that will 
lead to some decentralization in the big four.” BAF2 
As already mentioned in this report, an audit firm provides an audit service to a public 
interest entity is prohibited to provide a several type of works to the same audited entity, 
to its mother enterprise or to the entities over its control in the European Union. Some 
authors, as Gul et al. (2007) or Chung and Kallapur (2003), studied the relation between 
non-audit fees and audit independence. However, with the interviews, this study only 
intends to understand if audit firms perceived that the loss of a client in the audit area was 
compensated by the gain of the same client in other areas of the company. Small and 
medium audit firms are limited by the type of services offering to the customer, being 
that audit, in some cases, are the only service they provide. Henceforth, losing a client in 
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the audit field, won’t be compensated in other areas. However, public interest entities, 
with rare exceptions, are audited for big audit firms. The latter tend to have a diversified 
range of services available. Thus, interviews allowed to conclude that big audit firms 
perceived the loss of a client in the audit field, as an opportunity in other areas. Audit 
partners, losing a client due to the rotation obligation, provide that client information to 
the partner of other areas in order to keep him in the company. But, as BAF1 warned, the 
loss of a client in a field and a gain of the same in other areas implies an efficient 
management of the resources available in the company.  
-“Audit firms with some size are beginning to expand service provision to address this 
issue.” MAF2 
-“They end up benefiting companies that have a wider range of services. In this case, the 
distribution is not so linear. While at the audit level, the large firms do not have 
significant differences in volume, in the additional services there is a very steep slope. 
Some companies do not participate in audit’s tendering because it is more beneficial to 
continue providing the other services. Due to all the restrictions and risks, not always 
being a great customer auditor is attractive.” BAF1 
-“Portugal wanted to be even more restrictive in prohibiting the provision of a set of 
services. Somehow there may be a balance in the company, losing the customer in one 
area and gaining it in another. However, it depends on the type of services that the entity 
has to offer. There are entities that losing the client as an auditor, little else has to offer.” 
BAF2 
5.4. Auditor’s Opinion 
Concerning the issue of an opinion, the final output of the auditor’s work, as Melo (2014) 
already concluded in his study, this obligation will lead to a higher degree of opinion’s 
qualifications. Therefore the following question was imposed: “What influence, if any, 
that as an auditor/client expect to occur in the issue of opinion?”, and the answers are 
presented in table 10 and 11: 
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Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Influences auditor’s opinion No influences in auditor’s opinion 
SAF1 X  
SAF2 X  
SAF3  X 
MAF1 X  
MAF2 X  
BAF1  X 
BAF2 X  
CF1  X 
CF2  X 
Total 5 4 
% 55.56 44.44 
Table 10: Perception of the impact on auditor’s opinion 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Influences auditor’s 
opinion 
No influences in auditor’s 
opinion 
Small Audit Firms (SAF) 3  
Medium Audit Firms (MAF) 1 1 
Big Audit Firms (BAF) 1 1 
Clients Firms (CF)  2 
Total 5 4 
Table 11: Sum up perception of the impact on auditor’s opinion 
Through the analysis of tables 10 and 11, one can conclude that the majority of the 
interviewed (55.56%) perceive that MAFR will influence the auditor’s opinion. However, 
the clients, who agree among themselves, don’t share the same opinion with the majority 
of the auditors.  
The audited entities don’t perceive an influence in auditor’s opinion, as CF1 referred: 
“typically, we only work with the big four and the quality standards and work are very 
identical so I do not anticipate that there will be any kind of influence”. 
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Regarding audit firms perceptions, there is no agreement concerning the final impact on 
the issue of an opinion. Moreover, one can conclude that the perception of auditors is 
influenced by the size of the audit firm. While the auditors from small audit firms agree 
that MAFR will influence, the remaining auditors share some opposing opinions. The 
following excerpts from the interviews mirror these different positions: 
-“The financial crisis began in the stock market. There is a very big warning in telling the 
truth about the financial statements of public interest entities. These are quite sensitive, 
so they should be audited independently and in full. Twenty years ago the society did not 
know what a chartered accountant was, and nowadays it plays a very important role. The 
auditor has to act according to the new legislation that is beneficial not only for the 
market, but for the whole society.” SAF3 
-“The new auditor may take a different position from the previous one and this is what 
may impact the completion of the work. The outgoing auditor has certain "gray" 
situations of discussion that he has had with his client and certain positions he has taken 
that lead him to accept certain practices and their conclusion and opinion.” BAF2 
5.5. Final Balance 
In the literature review, there is not a final agreement regarding the main impact of 
MAFR. Hereupon, the final question of the interview aimed to perceive what were, if any, 
the others advantages/disadvantages of this legislation and if, in a global sense, this is 
benefit for the whole audit market. And the answers were (table 12): 
Interviewed 
Subcategories 
Positive No influence 
SAF1 X  
SAF2 X  
SAF3 X  
MAF1  X 
MAF2 X  
BAF1 X  
BAF2 X  
CF1 X  
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CF2 X  
Total 8 1 
% 88.89 11.11 
Table 12: Perceptions of the final balance of mandatory rotation 
Analyzing the table 12, 88.89% of the interviewed consider that the obligation of rotation 
is positive. MAF1 “don’t believe that the isolated question of the rotation has great 
influence”, but “globally, all measures taken by the government have a positive impact 
on the audit field”. 
The remaining participants pointed out advantages already mentioned in the literature 
review, such as: more competence, more credibility, a “fresh look” over the financial 
statements and to avoid familiarity. As can be seen in the following extracts: 
-“Everything that is quoted on the stock exchange, with high social responsibility, has to 
have turnover and the legislation has to be very demanding. All legislation that obliges 
entities not to create dependency relationships, not to subjugate them at the level of fees 
and that prevents the traffic of influences is beneficial. I am in favor of everything that 
can be done to ensure competence and independence.” SAF3 
-“I see rotation as a good practice, to avoid links with audit teams.” CF2 
Concerning to the disadvantages, besides the possible impacts on the variables already 
studied, BAF1 alerted to the management of the resources: 
-“One of the major disadvantages of rotation is the management of resources within 
organizations. An audit firm with large clients if they lose two or three clients at the same 
time, what make the people in charge of this project? And who earns these customers? 
Are you going to recruit? It ends up having two problems: lack of knowledge of the new 
client and lack of resources.” BAF1 
Also, CF1 consider that the fact of audit firm change, the relation between the audit firm 
and the audited entity can be compromised: 
-“One of the disadvantages is the investment that needs to be made each time you move. 
We all know that we are in a relationship with term which ends up limiting the level of 
trust between both parties. In addition to that the audit team ends up not having a deep 
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knowledge of ours and we ended up not feeling the same comfort. On the other hand, 
rotation allows new approaches and gives space to issues that in a stable situation may 
not be posed. I also believe that even within the big four, rotation will allow them to thrive 
and grow.” CF1 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to assess the perception of audit firms and audited entities concerning 
the impact of MAFR on audit quality, audit independence, audit market concentration 
and on the issue of an audit opinion. Despite the high number of studies in the literature 
review regarding these four variables, aforementioned, few of them have studied the 
impact of MAFR on them. Moreover, there is a lack of research having as base Portuguese 
data, and, in addition, there is not a consensus among the several authors regarding on the 
topic. While some authors are in favor of the obligation of audit firm rotation and defend 
that it will bring benefits for the audit sector (Bazerman et al., 2002, Davis et al., 2009, 
among others), others defend that benefits are not clear and that the inherent cost of this 
directive can be higher than the expected (Myers et al., 2003, Ghosh and Moon, 2005, 
among others).  
Hereupon, this investigation intended to fulfill a gap in the literature, by providing 
evidence of the perception of Portuguese audit firms (of different sizes) and audited 
entities on the impacts of the MAFR. Thus, nine people were interviewed, seven auditors 
and two clients, and their perceptions were studied.  
The results showed that MAFR is perceived as an improvement of audit independence by 
the clients, but auditors did not expect that it will influence their independence. 
Concerning quality, clients defend that MAFR won’t have influence, despite the fact that 
the majority of the auditors perceived that, in the first year, a decrease on quality is 
perceived. However, auditors and clients agreed that in the long run, an improvement of 
quality will be noticed, while, concerning the costs, the perception is that the obligation 
of change the audit team will influence it, but not significantly. Also, this new legislation 
is not perceived has having impact on audit market concentration, being it is influence 
related to the dispersion of market shares between the big four. Lastly, concerning the 
issue of an opinion, in the clients’ perspective MAFR is not perceived as having impact, 
while auditors defend that it will produce an influence.  
Moreover, this study allows to conclude that the size of the audit firm don’t influence the 
perceived impact in terms of costs and market concentration.  
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Besides the Italian example alerted for the hypothesis of MAFR not be the best solution 
of the European audit market, in order to enhance auditor’s independence and the quality 
of the audit work, our findings reinforce the relevance of the legislation once the majority 
perceived it has being benefic to the audit market.  
The approach presented in this research presents limitations. This is an exploratory study 
once legislation in cause is recent, the information is limited by existing few studies 
regarding the real effect of MAFR. Even more, the study considered a small sample, due 
to the adherence of participants. 
Further research is clearly needed and should be extended to more companies. Also, it 
will be interesting to study the impact of this legislation in audit quality measured, for 
example, through the earnings managements.  
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Annex 1 – Interview Questionnaire to the Audit Firms 
 
Name: 
 
 Sociodemographic Characterization 
Age: 
Gender: 
Academic Qualifications: 
Years of Statutory Audit: 
Job: 
 
 Questions 
 
Auditor’s Independence: 
 What impact do you expect to have on auditor independence? 
Audit Quality:  
 What impact do you expect audit firm rotation to have on audit quality in 
the first year? 
 What is the expected impact of the lack of knowledge of the client, 
business and industry on the quality of the audit work? 
Audit Market Concentration: 
 What impact do you expect the rotation of audit firms to have in market 
concentration? 
 Will the rotation of audit firms be an opportunity for small market players? 
 Audit firms rotation leads to loss of customers. Is it expected that the loss 
of customers in audit field leads to compensations, from the same 
customer, in another area (which was previously prohibited service)? Or 
is a "cut of relations" between the company and the client expected? 
 For small and medium audit firms: Due to the size of the audit firm, is 
there an interest in staying with the big clients that the big four are losing? 
Other Aspects: 
 What impact do you expect the rotation of audit firms to have in costs? 
 What influence, if any, that as an auditor expect to occur in your opinion? 
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 Does the rotation of audit firms make sense in general? Is it seen as an 
opportunity or a threat? Are there any other advantages / disadvantages 
you would like to mention? 
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Annex 2 – Interview Questionnaire to the Audited Entities 
 
Name: 
 
 Sociodemographic Characterization 
Age: 
Gender: 
Academic Qualifications: 
Years of working in the Public Interest Entity: 
Job: 
 
 Questions 
 
Audited Companies/Clients: 
 What impact do you expect audit rotation to have on quality? 
 What influence, if any, that as a client is expected to occur in the issue of 
opinion? 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages it provides the mandatory 
rotation of audit firms? 
 
 
